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Implications of the 2002 U.S. Farm Act for World Agriculture 
By John R. Kruse 
FAPRI – University of Missouri-Columbia 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implications of the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 for U.S. agriculture and its subsequent impact on world 
agricultural prices and world trade. In order to effectively illustrate the implications of the 
2002 Act it is important to consider it in the context of the changes already made in 
previous farm acts.  As the paper develops, many of the changes in U.S. cropping 
patterns were already captured by the policy changes occurring under the 1996 Federal 
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act. The estimated impact of the 2002 
Act on commodity production is minimal and therefore estimated price changes are 
relatively small.  In the conclusions is a discussion on how trends in U.S. farm policy 
tend to reflect international agricultural policy, an important observation as WTO 
negotiations are anticipated. 
 
Policy changes in the 2002 Act are discussed in detail followed by a description of how 
the policy instruments are incorporated in the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute’s (FAPRI) U.S. Crops model.  Implications of the policy changes for the 2002 
Act are discussed relative to a continuation of the FAIR Act.   A brief review of the 
possible implications for longer term trade, production, consumption and prices are also 
included.  Finally, some observations are included that trace the evolution of U.S. farm 
programs, especially the trend toward designs in the European Union. 
Policy Development Process 
The U.S. farm policy environment is shaped as much or more by current events as the 
goals portrayed to be accomplished.  To see this we have but to look at the FAIR Act.  In 
1995, with high commodity prices driven by record levels of imports, many analysts 
began discussing new “price plateaus” and “demand driven” agriculture.   Bolstered by 
rising per capita incomes and emerging middle classes, many of the Asian markets 
appeared to be strongly growing markets for U.S. agricultural exports.  The high levels of 
optimism for agricultural exports and relatively high agricultural prices, led policy 
makers to formulate a 1996 farm bill that clearly marked a path for reduced U.S. 
agricultural subsidies.  Target price and counter cyclical deficiency payments were 
replaced with declining fixed transition payments based on historical acreage and yields.  
Set asides and other annual forms of supply control were eliminated although the long-
term conservation reserve program was maintained and expanded.  Loan rates continued, 
but many analysts considered them to be irrelevant because there were set at such low 
levels relative to current price levels.  The relevant subsidies appeared to be fully 
decoupled and very WTO friendly.   
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Unfortunately, it was only a few years into the 1996 farm bill, when export growth 
stagnated and agricultural commodity prices began plummeting.   The farm sector 
immediately called for “safety net” protection from low prices and the U.S. congress 
passed four years of sequential disaster assistance legislation to supplement the declining 
transition payments.  When the 2002 farm bill debate began in early 2001, the emphasis 
switched from phasing out subsidies to once again providing a safety net to U.S. farmers.  
It is also important to note that this debate began in a period of U.S. budget surpluses.  
Interestingly, the debate began with how much additional money would be spent on 
agriculture over and above what would be spent under a continuation of the FAIR Act.  
$73.5 billion in additional agricultural spending to be allocated over the 2002 to 2011 
period emerged as a target for the new policy proposals.  Subsequently, the House and 
Senate policy proposals were designed to spend as close to this spending limit as 
possible.   
 
The 2002 farm bill proposals from the House and Senate Agricultural committees were a 
hybrid of the 1990 and 1996 Acts.   As in the 1990 farm bill, both proposed bills included 
the reestablishment of target prices and quasi-deficiency payments referred to as 
“countercyclical payments”.  However like the FAIR Act, both proposals carried the 
flavor of de-coupled payments by using a historical production base rather than current 
production for establishing countercyclical payments and fixed payments similar to 
transition payments.  In addition, neither of the bills contained any restrictions on which 
crop could be planted, nor any annual set aside nor annual supply controls.   New to the 
2002 farm bill proposals was the inclusion of soybeans and peanuts as program crops, the 
option to update historical cropping bases, and, in the Senate proposal, the option to 
update program yields.   Loan rates were increased for many of the crops with the major 
exception of soybeans.  The resulting Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) 
of 2002, reflected all of these ideas with all but the loan rate changes decoupled from 
production.   
Changes in the 2002 Farm Bill 
In May 2002, FSRIA became law.  As discussed above, FSRIA brought back a number of 
old policy provisions from the two previous farm bills while introducing a few new 
concepts.  The discussion of these changes focuses on those policies which “couple” 
subsidies directly with current production and those that are “de-coupled” from current 
production.   In addition a brief description of the U.S. National Dairy Program has been 
included. 
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Coupled Subsidies 
As a carryover from the two previous farm acts, loan deficiency payments are the only 
remaining U.S. policy mechanism tied directly to current production.  There are actually 
two ways for producers to profit from the marketing loan program.  This occurs because 
of the way the program is administered.   The straight forward way, is the standard loan 
deficiency payment that is 
calculated as the difference 
between the local market price 
on the day the farm chooses to 
get his loan deficiency payment 
and the loan rate.  Of course 
this payment applies to every 
bushel produced.  Note that the 
producer does not have to sell 
his crop on that day.    The 
second indirect way to make 
money is to then hold the crop 
until the post-harvest season and sell it for a higher price.  This indirect profit is called a 
marketing loan gain.   In the past 3 years, marketing loan gains for corn have averaged 
$0.20 per bushel.  Table 1 illustrates the new loan rates effective under FSRI relative to 
the loan rates under the 1996 FAIR Act.  With the exception of soybeans, all other loans 
are either higher or at least at the same level.  As this paper discusses later, it is primarily 
the lowering of the soybean loan rate that causes the greatest shift in acres from soybeans 
to other crops under FSRIA. 
De-Coupled Subsidies 
Under the 1996 FAIR Act, one fixed de-coupled subsidy was paid to producers based on 
historical production.  Different terms have been used to reflect these payments including 
production flexibility contract payments (PFC payments), transition payments (AMTA 
payments), and/or direct payments.  The fixed payment rates declined over the course of 
the 1996 FAIR Act ultimately falling to the levels presented in Table 2.  Under FSRIA 
these fixed payments were increased 
slightly for all crops and a payment was 
added for soybeans.  While these 
payment rates may appear to provide 
production incentives, they are paid 
based on 85 percent of the producer’s 
historical base acres and historical 
program yields.   Regardless of the mix 
of crops a producer plants or doesn’t 
plant, they received the fixed payment 
rate base on their historical base acres 
and program yields.  For the purposes of 
calculating total fixed payments under FSRIA producers have been given the option to 
update their base acres from those under the FAIR Act to the average of the acres planted 
Table 1.  Comparison of Loan Rates 
  (U.S. $/Bushel) 
FAIR Act 2002 Farm Bill  
Maximums 2002-03 2004-07 
Corn $1.89 $1.98 $1.95
Wheat $2.58 $2.80 $2.75
Soybeans $5.26 $5.00 $5.00
Sorghum Rel. to corn $1.98 $1.95
Cotton $0.5192 $0.52 $0.52
Rice $6.50 $6.50 $6.50
Table 2.  Comparison of Fixed Payment  
 Rates  (U.S. $/Bushel) 
 1996 
Fair Act 
2002 
Farm Bill 
Corn $0.26 $0.28
Wheat $0.46 $0.52
Soybeans $0.00 $0.44
Sorghum $0.31 $0.35
Cotton $0.0572 $0.0667
Rice $2.05 $2.35
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Target Price
Direct 
Payment
Loan Rate
Counter-cyclical
Payment
Loan Deficiency
Payment
Not
Tied
to
Prod
Prod
Req.
$3.86
$0.52
$3.34
$2.80
Regardless
of Market
Only if Price Less than $3.34
and considered planted over the 1998 to 2001 period.  Depending the crop mix and 
historical crop base, updating crop bases may or may not be attractive to all producers.  
Fixed payment yields remained frozen at the same levels as previous farm bills.  Since 
soybeans were not previously a program crop, 78 percent of the 1998-2001 average farm 
soybean yields is used as the program yield. 
 
The new payment introduced under FSRIA is the countercyclical payment (CCP).  CCPs 
are similar to the old deficiency payment system with two important differences. 
First, CCPs are based on 85 percent of a farm’s historical crop base instead of current 
production.  Second CCPs are also reduced by the amount of the fixed payment discussed 
above.  The CCPs required the reestablishment of target prices that were abolished in the 
1996 FAIR act.  Table 3 presents a comparison of the new target prices with those from 
the 1990 Farm Act.  The 
countercyclical payment rate is 
calculated as the target price 
less the fixed payment less the 
maximum of the loan rate or 
the season average farm price. 
Despite which crop the 
producer grows, CCPs are paid 
on historical production instead 
of current production.  As in the 
case of fixed payments, 
producers have the option to 
update their historical crop base to the 1998 to 2001 period average of planted and 
consider planted area.  If they updated their base acreage, they also have the option of 
updating their program yields to the 1998 to 2001 period average.   
 
Figure 1 brings these concepts together in an illustration for the wheat market in 2002.  
The amount of payments the 
wheat producer receives 
depends upon where season 
average farm price falls.  For 
example, suppose the season 
average wheat price is $2.70 
per bushel.  The loan rate for 
wheat in the 2002/03 
marketing year is $2.80 per 
bushel ($102.88 per metric 
ton).  The producer will 
receive a loan deficiency 
payment equal to the 
difference between the loan 
rate and the season average farm price, or $0.10 per bush in this example.  In addition, 
the producer will get the maximum counter-cyclical payment, $0.54 per bushel, as well as 
the direct payment of $0.52 per bushel.  But remember that the direct and the counter-
Table 3.  Comparison of Target Prices 
 (U.S. $/Bushel)  
1990 Farm 2002 Farm Bill  
Bill 2002-03 2004-07 
Corn $2.75 $2.60 $2.63
Wheat $4.00 $3.86 $3.92
Soybeans N/A $5.80 $5.80
Sorghum 2.61 $2.54 $2.57
Cotton $0.729 $0.724 $0.724
Rice $10.71 $10.50 $10.50
Figure 1.  Structure of Wheat Payments 
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cyclical payments are based on a portion of the historical production base as determined 
by the producer’s base area, program yields, and countercyclical yield selection. 
The CRP Program 
Another important change in the 2002 Farm Act was the expansion of the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP).  The 2002 Farm Act expands the CRP cap from 36.4 million to 
39.2 million acres.  
The National Dairy Program 
The 2002 FSRI Act also added a short-term subsidy to the U.S. dairy industry.  The Act 
establishes a three and half year National Dairy Program to subsidize milk production.  
Milk subsides are based on 45 percent of the difference between $16.94 and the Boston 
Class I price.  Milk producers can receive payments on up to 2.4 million pounds of 
production for an operation annually.  The National Dairy Program ends in September 
2005. 
FAPRI Policy Modeling Framework 
Analysis of the U.S. farm policy is now broken into two distinct but interdependent 
processes.  In the traditional manner, a ten-year deterministic baseline forecast is 
developed incorporating the various agricultural policies, specific macro economic 
assumptions supplied by Global Insight, Inc., and assuming average weather.  The second 
process, stochastic analysis, involves the simulation of the baseline under 500 alternative 
forecasts of the random supply and demand factors.  Each of the forecasts represents a 
random draw from the distributions of the random supply and demand factors.  Variance-
covariance matrices are used to make a draw consistent within the random supply and 
demand factors.  Implications of the stochastic analysis are particularly important for 
calculation of government cost.  While loan deficiency payments are made during low 
price simulations, government payments are not made during periods of high prices.  
Therefore government payments are much higher on average from the stochastic runs.   
 
The FAPRI system of econometric models is a simultaneous, non-spatial, partial 
equilibrium system designed for the purpose of policy analysis.  The intricate details of 
the entire model are beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief discussion of the macro 
view of the model and the specifics relating to U.S. policy are discussed in the paragraphs 
that follow.   The broad framework of the FAPRI global agricultural modeling system is 
depicted by Figures 2 and 3.     Figure 2 conceptualizes the basic structural model for the 
United States that can be extended to any country with a few small adjustments.  The top 
half of Figure 1 is simplified representation of the livestock sector, while the bottom half 
reflects the crops sector.  The left half of Figure 2 represents demand variables and the 
right side of the diagram contains the supply variables.   The macroeconomic variables 
driving this system include population, income growth, and input costs as well as 
technology and policy.   For example, suppose an increase in income occurs.  Positive 
income elasticities in the meat sector imply increased the demand for meat, which 
increases meat prices and provides additional production incentives.  Increased meat 
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production increases feed demand in the crops sector.  Depending on the income 
elasticity for the crop in question, food demand may also increase in the crops sector.  
Strong demand for crop inputs increases crop prices and provides incentives to expand 
crop production.    
 
Figure 3 illustrates the simultaneous process within and across the country models that 
determines the net trade position within each country and the level of “world” prices.  
Typically, a large exporting country with minimal trade barriers is chosen as the residual 
supplier of a particular commodity.  In the case of corn, the residual supplier is the United 
States, while Thailand serves as the residual supplier for rice.  The iterative process to 
find a simultaneous solution begins with an assumed net export path within the residual 
supplier.  This assumption generates a set of prices within the exporting country that is 
limited by transportation costs, trade barriers, and exchange rates to form a representative 
import price for a given country.  In some countries, import tariffs are high enough that 
the world prices have no impact on domestic prices.  In this situation, the effective import 
quota is used as the net trade path and the internal prices are simultaneously determined 
within the country’s own supply and demand framework.  India has traditionally been a 
good example of a country where internal prices are fairly insulated from world prices 
due to trade restrictions.  For other countries with some degree of price transmission, the 
respective import price is used to determine the local supply and demand within the 
Figure 2  U.S. Country Model Flow Diagram 
Per Capita Meat 
Consumption
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Seed Demand
Exports
Ending Stocks
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Meat Production
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country and the market clearing identity determines net trade.  This process is repeated 
across all of the countries in the model system until a new net export position is derived 
for the residual supplier.  Several iterations occur to determined prices that balance world 
trade. 
Assume an export path for the Residual 
Supplier
Residual Supplier 
Country Model
Residual Supplier Farm 
Price
World
Price
Recursive Country 
Model
Net trade positions
are summed across 
countries
Net exports needed 
become the Residual 
Supplier's export path
Exchange Rates
Trade Barriers
Local country's 
government policy
Residual Supplier 
government policy
Local Market Price
Import Price
subject to quotas
Simultaneous Country 
Model
Net Import 
(might be negative)
Net Import 
(might be negative)
Price TransmissionNo Price Transmission
 
Figure 3  Iterative Process to Determine Global Equilibrium 
 
Keeping in mind the big picture, the intricacies of modeling the 2002 U.S. farm policy 
changes can now be discussed.  The coupled payments, loan deficiency payments in the 
U.S. case, are directly included in the crop specific U.S. acreage equations.  In the FAPRI 
U.S. agricultural model, individual crop acreage equations are specified as a function of 
the expected net returns for the crop and expected net returns of competing crops.  
Expected net returns are calculated using naive price expectations.  More formally, these 
equations are specified as: 
 
c c+1i
i
c+j
E(Net Returns ) E(Net Returns )E(Net Returns ) , , ,
Deflator Deflator DeflatorArea Planted
E(Net Returns ) De-Coupled Payments, ,
Deflator Deflator
f
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠L
 
 
where  
 
k,(t-1) k,t k k
k
(Max(Farm Price ,Loan Rate )*Trend Yield -Variable Cost of Production ))
E(Net Returns )
Deflator
=  
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The 2002 Act includes several program options that complicated the analysis.  One of 
these program options was the sequence of first, updating base acreage and, given that 
decision, the option to update program yields.  While it might seem that all producers 
would take advantage of higher yields, some producers with large historical bases in 
crops such as cotton and/or rice may not wish to update their bases because their recent 
plantings of cotton and rice are considerably lower.  Subsequently, the gain from higher 
countercyclical program yields is more than offset by the loss in government payments 
due to a reduction in base acres.  Since the decision would be unique to each producer, 
FAPRI ultimately evaluated the decision to update base area and subsequently update 
CCP yields at the county level and then reconstructed state and regional base acres and 
CCP yields based on those decisions.  Not surprisingly, counties with large historical 
bases of cotton and rice, generally tended to maintain base area as defined under the 1996 
FAIR Act. 
 
As the specification above suggests, the inclusion of the decoupled payments in the 
FAPRI models is an ad-hoc process.  Other researchers (Miranda, et al. 1994) have 
incorporated decoupled payments by specifying a total acreage equation for all crops as 
function of expected revenues including decoupled payments and then estimating share 
equations for each crop.  However, the timing and relatively few observations prevented 
FAPRI from attempting this approach directly.   
 
The initial ad hoc approach developed at FAPRI to include de-coupled payments was 
created by looking at how acreage responded to higher net returns historically.  Table 4 
presents a matrix of deflated expected net return coefficients used in the model.   By 
summing all of the coefficients in the model on can calculate an acreage expansion 
coefficient.  In the case of the of the 2002 Farm Act analysis as measured off the 2001 
 
FAPRI stochastic baseline, the acreage expansion coefficient was 14.778.  This 
coefficient, multiplied by the so-called “De-coupled Scaling Factor” and the average real 
decoupled payment per acre produced the total acreage effect.  The total acreage effect 
was allocated to the relevant crops in the region using the crop’s 1999-2000 historical 
acreage share.  This process may be better understood with an example.  Utilizing the 
coefficients from FAPRI’s acreage equations in Table 4, the acreage expansion 
coefficient was 14.778.    Simply based on judgment, FAPRI chose a de-coupled scaling 
Table 4.  Matrix of Coefficients on Deflated Expected Net Returns
Barley Corn Cotton Oats Rice Soybeans Soybeans Sorghum Sunflowers Wheat Total
(Sgl) (Dbl) (Sgl)
Barley 2.800 -0.287 -0.028 -0.084 -0.018 -0.250 -0.009 -0.014 -0.073 -1.000 1.037
Corn -0.573 11.577 -0.303 -0.693 -0.063 -5.877 -0.422 -0.609 -0.263 -2.700 0.075
Cotton -0.037 -0.577 2.505 -0.028 -0.070 -0.776 -0.235 -0.355 0.000 -0.397 0.030
Oats -0.056 -0.257 -0.008 2.100 -0.002 -0.152 -0.011 -0.014 -0.019 -0.700 0.879
Rice -0.014 -0.058 -0.054 -0.002 0.400 -0.051 -0.059 -0.037 0.000 -0.120 0.004
Soybeans(Sgl) -0.503 -5.804 -0.331 -0.544 -0.118 11.596 -0.412 -0.420 -0.224 -3.020 0.218
Soybeans(Dbl) -0.011 -0.425 -0.103 -0.018 -0.045 -0.468 1.405 -0.025 0.000 -0.144 0.166
Sorghum -0.014 -0.502 -0.107 -0.043 -0.022 -0.231 -0.016 3.742 -0.035 -1.294 1.478
Sunflowers -0.148 -0.166 0.000 -0.059 0.000 -0.100 0.000 -0.022 1.455 -0.512 0.448
Wheat (Sgl) -1.289 -3.147 -0.420 -0.600 -0.053 -1.629 -0.057 -1.051 -0.522 19.212 10.443
Total 14.778
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factor of 0.4 in the for the FSRI stochastic policy scenarios.  Since 500 different scenarios 
were run for the stochastic process, there are 500 different observations of total de-
coupled payments.  Choosing one of the scenarios, the de-coupled payments were 
projected to average $20.68 per acre in 2002 while the deflator in 2002 to was projected 
to be 117.95.  Subsequently the total expansion in acreage is expected to be 1.037 million 
acres in 2002 due to the de-coupled payments.  This acreage is then allocated to the crops 
using their historical shares as a guide.   
 
Clearly, the impacts of the de-coupled payments are conditional upon the coefficient 
matrix of deflated expected net returns and the de-coupled scaling factor.  The fixed 
payments from the 1996 farm bill provide some guidance for setting these factors, 
however clearly they may need to be adjusted as producer’s responsiveness unfolds in 
years to come.  With FAPRI’s January 2003 stochastic baseline, both the matrix of 
coefficients on deflated expected net returns and the de-coupled scaling factor were 
adjusted.  Using pooled data over the 1996 to 2001 period, better estimates of the 
regional acreage expansion coefficients were derived and a greater degree of symmetry 
was imposed on the matrix of coefficients.   The de-coupled scaling factors were also 
changed. Instead of using a de-coupled scaling factor of 0.40 for all decoupled payments, 
in the March 2003 stochastic baseline, FAPRI now imposes a 0.25 scaling factor for the 
countercyclical payments and an additional scaling factor of 0.25 for all decoupled 
payments.  This effectively makes the effect of countercyclical payments double that of a 
fixed (direct) payment.  The adjustments appear to be more consistent with recent acreage 
responses including the March 31, 2003, “Planting Intentions” report released by USDA. 
CRP Adjustments 
The additional acreage assumed to be bid into the CRP does take some acreage out of 
production although the relationship is not assumed to be 1 for 1.  The slippage factor 
used in the 2002 Farm Act analysis was 80 percent, meaning the for every acre put into 
CRP, 0.2 acres were take out of total arable area.  In addition, FAPRI projects that the 
CRP program will only rise from 33.5 million acres in 2001 to 38.5 million acres in 2011, 
0.7 million acres short of the cap.  However, the additional acres bid into the program 
slightly reduce the acreage expansion that would have otherwise occurred under the FSRI 
Act. 
Implications of the FSRI Act for World Agriculture 
The FAPRI March 2001, baseline was the last baseline forecast that included a straight 
extension of the 1996 farm bill with no continuation of ad hoc emergency, “double 
AMTA”, payments.  The stochastic means from the March 2001 baseline were compared 
with the stochastic means resulting from then implementation of the FSRI Act and these 
results are presented in Tables 5 through 8.  As Table 5 suggests, the acreage and price 
implications are minimal.  All crops with the exception of soybeans, experience a slight 
increase in area.  The reduction in soybean loan rates is the driver behind the decline in 
soybean area planted.  On average total area planted to the nine major crops increases by 
only 1.03 million acres.   Subsequently, U.S. crop prices fall very slightly averaging 3 to 
5 cents lower per bushel across the commodities in Table 5 with the exception of 
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soybeans.  Note that most of the fall in prices occurs early in the decade because the 
current low world prices generate greater payments in the early period.  Soybean prices 
increase slightly do to a reduction in area planted, but the price grains are short lived as 
South America compensates.  Crop gross returns do appear to be significantly higher in 
Table 5, but they do include the decoupled payments as well. 
 
Table 5.  Impacts of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 on the U.S. Crop Sector
Units 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 02-10 avg.
Planted area (Changes on a crop-year basis relative to a March 2001 baseline)
  9 major crops* mil. acres 2.09 1.96 1.46 1.14 0.90 0.66 0.47 0.35 0.23 1.03
    Wheat mil. acres 1.19 1.10 0.69 0.55 0.36 0.27 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.50
    Corn mil. acres 1.31 1.15 0.80 0.63 0.53 0.43 0.31 0.26 0.20 0.62
    Soybeans mil. acres -1.33 -1.17 -0.82 -0.76 -0.67 -0.60 -0.48 -0.42 -0.38 -0.74
    Upland cotton mil. acres 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.08
    Rice mil. acres 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
    Sorghum mil. acres 0.47 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.30
    Barley mil. acres 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.08
    Oats mil. acres 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.16
    Sunflowers mil. acres 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Crop prices
  Wheat $/bu. -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
  Corn $/bu. -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
  Soybeans $/bu. 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05
  Upland cotton $/lb. -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
  Rice $/cwt -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05
  Sorghum $/bu. -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05
  Barley $/bu. -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
Crop gross returns**
  Wheat $/bu. 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.26
  Corn $/bu. 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.14
  Soybeans $/bu. 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28
  Upland cotton $/lb. 0.089 0.086 0.083 0.079 0.074 0.067 0.063 0.058 0.053 0.07
  Rice $/cwt 1.13 0.93 0.90 0.78 0.71 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.45 0.73
  Sorghum $/bu. 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.23
  Barley $/bu. 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.12
* Wheat, corn, soybeans, upland cotton, rice, sorghum, barley, oats, and sunflowers
** Gross returns include program payments
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The impacts of FSRI on milk production can be found in Table 6.  Milk production is 1.2 
billion pounds higher over the 2003 to 2005 during the operation of the National Milk 
Program.  As a result milk prices are lower by about $0.33 per gallon, but producer’s 
gross returns are higher by $0.21 per cwt over the 2003 to 2005 period.  As the program 
expires in 2005, milk prices continue to be lower resulting in an average increase of just 
$0.02 in milk gross returns over 2002 to 2011 period. 
 
As reported in Table 7, the U.S. government does spend a total of 62.8 billion dollars 
more in the 2000 Act, over 70 percent of which shows in net farm income.  In Table 8, 
net farm income averages $4.5 billion per year higher over the 2002 to 2011 period, than 
under the 1996 FAIR Act. 
 
 
Table 6.  Impacts of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 on the U.S. Dairy Sector
Units 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 02-11 avg.
(Changes on a calendar-year basis relative to a December 2001 baseline)
Milk production bil. lbs. 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6
All-milk price $/cwt -0.12 -0.22 -0.33 -0.41 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.06 -0.18
Gross returns* $/cwt 0.38 0.31 0.21 0.11 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.06 0.02
* Gross returns include total program payments divided by total milk production
Table 7.  Impacts of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 on CCC Net Outlays
Units 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 02-11 total
(Changes on a fiscal-year basis relative to a March 2001 baseline)
Title I (Commodities) $ bil. 3.62 4.61 7.67 7.43 6.05 5.15 4.01 4.19 3.71 3.23 49.66
Title II (Conservation) $ bil. 0.34 0.45 0.83 1.20 1.52 1.64 1.64 1.74 1.86 1.98 13.21
  Titles I and II $ bil. 3.97 5.06 8.50 8.63 7.56 6.80 5.65 5.93 5.57 5.21 62.87
Table 8.  Impacts of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 on Net Farm Income
Units 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 02-11 avg.
(Changes on a calendar-year basis relative to a March 2001 baseline)
Title I (Commodities) $ bil. 4.57 6.11 5.47 5.08 3.99 2.61 2.95 2.72 2.41 2.12 3.80
Title II (Conservation) $ bil. 0.09 0.28 0.50 0.71 0.89 0.92 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.70
  Titles I and II $ bil. 4.66 6.39 5.97 5.79 4.88 3.53 3.81 3.59 3.31 3.05 4.50
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In Table 9, the impacts on U.S. exports are presented for the major commodities the U.S. 
exports.  In general, the table reflects very small changes in U.S. export levels.  As with 
acreage, exports increase slightly for all crops with the exception of soybeans and 
soybean products.   
 
 
 
 
 
So why doesn’t the projected $62.8 billion have more of an effect on U.S. agricultural 
production?  In large part, it is because most of the payments are de-coupled from current 
levels of production.  To a lesser extent, the supply controls that were removed in the 
1996 FAIR Act already allowed U.S. farmers to expand crop area to their productive 
limits given current commodity price levels.    Finally, as Table 10 illustrates, the ad hoc 
disaster assistance offered in the last four years of the 1996 FAIR Act was roughly at the 
same level of the direct and CCP payment offered under the 2002 Act.   
 
The 2002 FSRI Act And The WTO 
With at least $62.8 billion more in additional spending on U.S. agricultural policy, the 
burning question is whether the United States likely to exceed its WTO commitments.   
Table 9.  Impacts of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 on the U.S. Crop Sector
Units 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 02-10 avg.
US Exports (Changes on a crop-year basis relative to a March 2001 baseline)
  Wheat Million MT 0.48 0.85 0.86 0.73 0.56 0.42 0.29 0.20 0.14 0.50
  % Chg 1.7% 2.9% 2.9% 2.4% 1.8% 1.4% 0.9% 0.6% 0.4%
  Corn Million MT 0.53 1.11 1.45 1.50 1.40 1.22 0.99 0.77 0.60 1.06
  % Chg 1.0% 2.0% 2.4% 2.4% 2.2% 1.9% 1.5% 1.1% 0.8%
  Soybeans Million MT -0.44 -0.92 -0.88 -0.76 -0.63 -0.54 -0.47 -0.41 -0.36 -0.60
  % Chg -1.5% -3.1% -2.9% -2.5% -2.0% -1.7% -1.5% -1.3% -1.1%
  Soybean Meal 1000 MT -126.1 -74.6 -19.1 -12.1 -27.5 -38.4 -33.7 -31.4 -29.8 -43.62
  % Chg -1.8% -1.1% -0.3% -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -0.5% -0.5% -0.4%
  Soybean Oil 1000 MT -35.52 -33.26 -20.05 -15.07 -14.97 -14.94 -12.13 -10.32 -9.33 -18.40
  % Chg -5.0% -4.4% -2.5% -1.8% -1.7% -1.7% -1.3% -1.1% -1.0%
  Upland cotton 1000 MT 12.08 17.07 20.84 20.69 18.89 16.47 13.86 11.67 10.11 15.742
  % Chg 0.7% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5%
  Rice Million MT 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
  % Chg 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
  Sorghum Million MT 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.11
  % Chg 2.2% 2.9% 2.8% 2.5% 2.2% 1.8% 1.5% 1.2% 0.9%
13 
   History      FAIR Act FSRIA Change      FAIR Act FSRIA Change
98-00 Crops 2002 Crop 2002 Crop from FAIR 02-07 Crops 02-07 Crops from FAIR
AL 110,376 46,925         95,472         48,547       42,307         85,825         43,518        
AK 263 83                135              52              83                142              59               
AZ 117,953 50,010         139,669       89,659       46,219         128,240       82,021        
AR 811,370 567,921       811,113       243,192     484,659       684,582       199,922      
CA 530,775 319,844       565,830       245,987     287,852       500,509       212,657      
CO 248,966 117,188       234,430       117,242     100,848       192,179       91,331        
CT 2,831 1,531           2,781           1,250         1,287           2,321           1,034          
DE 19,024 13,747         25,072         11,325       10,718         20,498         9,780          
FL 21,604 10,150         20,916         10,766       9,375           19,049         9,674          
GA 237,443 99,784         221,223       121,439     90,148         200,098       109,950      
ID 181,147 85,956         176,734       90,778       75,553         142,965       67,412        
IL 1,548,884 1,055,133    1,610,541    555,408     843,969       1,330,734    486,765      
IN 748,542 510,114       786,568       276,454     408,925       652,038       243,113      
IA 1,718,027 1,154,812    1,704,048    549,236     929,615       1,415,614    485,999      
KS 1,052,347 524,289       1,039,564    515,275     441,884       844,016       402,132      
KY 175,524 104,458       172,247       67,788       85,170         141,883       56,713        
LA 364,270 206,223       347,058       140,836     182,456       304,144       121,688      
ME 3,902 2,475           4,584           2,108         1,944           3,778           1,834          
MD 59,484 40,540         70,040         29,500       31,808         56,796         24,988        
MA 1,758 934              1,697           763            790              1,424           634             
MI 296,223 187,163       285,925       98,762       151,732       236,338       84,606        
MN 1,135,303 766,073       1,160,867    394,794     607,441       942,567       335,126      
MS 397,293 211,101       368,476       157,375     183,386       323,602       140,216      
MO 572,962 381,413       574,267       192,854     308,704       475,416       166,712      
MT 297,660 129,238       266,327       137,088     116,237       218,262       102,025      
NE 1,158,488 674,634       1,124,702    450,068     557,807       938,043       380,236      
NV 1,994 1,021           2,063           1,042         954              1,803           848             
NH 1,476 806              1,440           634            658              1,172           514             
NJ 8,675 5,725           10,616         4,891         4,555           8,891           4,336          
NM 51,366 22,795         45,406         22,611       20,246         39,051         18,804        
NY 73,269 35,925         71,504         35,579       31,359         61,989         30,630        
NC 216,734 114,441       216,635       102,194     95,716         185,788       90,072        
ND 731,210 403,415       676,488       273,073     334,934       536,269       201,336      
OH 534,530 369,324       567,561       198,237     292,408       463,077       170,670      
OK 333,039 136,121       294,900       158,779     123,627       246,081       122,454      
OR 84,030 35,389         74,660         39,271       31,803         60,705         28,902        
PA 62,103 35,066         97,524         62,457       29,564         86,651         57,088        
RI 92 49                89                40              41                75                34               
SC 81,037 39,153         73,697         34,544       34,275         64,788         30,513        
SD 582,180 391,814       605,878       214,064     310,215       487,005       176,790      
TN 182,878 96,431         172,497       76,066       80,649         147,042       66,393        
TX 1,261,042 569,687       1,151,864    582,177     512,215       1,011,791    499,577      
UT 18,361 8,363           16,917         8,554         7,391           14,060         6,669          
VT 4,936 2,721           4,831           2,110         2,232           3,956           1,723          
VA 70,673 40,902         72,040         31,138       33,615         60,094         26,479        
WA 222,744 92,240         199,026       106,786     81,362         158,729       77,367        
WV 5,259 2,707           4,503           1,796         2,356           3,894           1,538          
WI 350,957 206,865       338,486       131,620     171,967       286,521       114,554      
WY 20,973 10,518         20,579         10,061       9,400           17,418         8,017          
US 16,711,976 9,883,218    16,529,488  6,646,270  8,212,457    13,807,912  5,595,455   
Table 10. Comparison of Crop Payments:
Historical, Projected FAIR Act and FSRIA
(Annual Averages, Thousand Dollars)
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Using the box terminology from the previous WTO negotiation, the amber box is 
designation for policies that are considered to be trade distorting and have an aggregate 
spending limit attached to them.  
 
However, there are a couple of loopholes in the amber box.   The de minimis rule 
exempts spending on amber box programs in the spending is below the agreed upon 
percentage of the value of production.  In the case of the United States the agreed to 
percentage is 5 percent.  If the spending is below 5 percent of the value of production, 
then it is not counted against the amber box limit.  However, if the spending exceeds 5 
percent of the value of production then all of the spend counts against the limit. 
 
Within the amber box, trade-distorting subsidies are divided into two types, product-
specific and non-product-specific.  The de minimis rule applies differently to the two 
types of subsidies.  For product specific subsidies, the 5 percent limit applies directly to 
the value of the specific crops getting subsidized.  For non-production specific subsidies, 
the 5 percent limit applies to the entire value of all U.S. agricultural production.   
 
Clearly the loan deficiency payments are product-specific and fall within the trade 
distorting amber box.  Since decoupled direct payments are not are not tied to current 
production that are classified as minimally trade distorting or “green box” in the box 
terminology.  Now the big question is which box the CCPs belong in.  The CCPs are not 
tied to current production, but they are tied to current prices.   Thus, while they are not 
product-specific, they appear to be non-product-specific payments.  Certainly other 
interpretations are possible, but for the calculation of WTO commitments, FAPRI has 
placed CCPs in the amber box.    
 
In the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations, the United States agreed to limit its amber 
box spending to $19.1 billion per year.  In the May 2002, baseline, FAPRI estimated that 
there was a 19.3 percent chance that the U.S. would exceed its WTO limit on amber box 
farm subsidies.   
 
Emerging Trends In Agricultural Policy 
While it may seem that U.S. policy took a step backwards toward the policies in the 1990 
Farm Bill, three important trends have emerged.  The first of these trends appears to be 
motivated in part by the desire to stay within WTO commitments.   Throughout the 2002 
FSRI Act, a partial attempt at de-coupling payments from current production was made in 
order to stay within WTO commitments.  Other countries such as the EU’s CAP Reform 
have made policy revisions that attempt to de-couple subsidies from current production.  
The EU continues to ease down intervention prices while partially offsetting price 
declines with de-coupled compensatory payments.      
 
The second significant trend is the continued movement away from supply control as a 
means of supporting prices.  Some of the EU’s current proposals include a reduction and 
possibly elimination of set aside programs.  In the 2002 farm bill debate, there appeared 
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to be very little discussion of supply controls.  Part of the motivation for dropping supply 
controls appears to be that as countries reduce their barriers to imports and grant greater 
market access, they have realized they can no longer effectively support domestic prices 
with supply controls. 
 
The third important trend is that a number of countries have developed policies that 
include a countercyclical mechanism especially to help with periods of low prices.  
Countercyclical payments in the 2002 U.S. Farm Act and Ontario, Canada’s Grain and 
Oilseed Payment scheme are two recent examples.   
 
Conclusions 
 The 2002 FSRI Act has relatively minor impacts on current U.S. commodity production, 
agricultural prices and world trade because most of the additional spending is de-coupled 
from current levels of production.  About 66 percent of the additional payments are from 
the newly added CCPs.  In many ways, the FSRI Act formalized the add hoc payments 
AMTA payments made the last four years of the 1996 FAIR Act.  The single biggest crop 
implication from the 2002 FSRI Act is the reduction in the soybean loan rate which 
lowers soybean are planted and increases soybean prices,  Even this impact is small, 
averaging less than 0.75 million acres over the 2002 – 2010 period.  The addition of a 
National Dairy Program does bolster milk returns in the short run, but as the program 
expires the positive effects are nearly offset by lower longer-term milk prices.   
 
The continuing trend of de-coupled subsidies with no supply controls is engrained in the 
FSRI Act. The CCPs help reduce the downside price risk for U.S. agriculture, while the 
market loan rate provides protection for exceptionally low prices. If world production 
continues to be large, keeping world prices low, U.S. producers will continue to produce 
because of loan rate protection.  There is potential for competitors to feel greater price 
pressure, and countries with the deepest pockets will be best protected.  Given the 
program parameters, perhaps of greater importance long term is the small chance that the 
U.S. could be in a position to violate the WTO spending limits.   
16 
REFERENCES 
 
Miranda, Mario J., Frank Novak, and Mel Lerohl.  “Acreage Response Under Canada’s 
Western Grains Stabilization Program.” Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 76(May 1994):270-
276. 
 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI). 2001. “U.S. and World 
Agricultural Outlook.” Staff Report 1-01, Iowa State University, Ames, and the 
University of Missouri-Columbia, January. 
 
_____. 2001. “Preliminary Analysis of the Grain, Oilseed and Cotton Provisions of the 
House Committee on Agriculture’s Draft Farm Bill Concept Paper.”  FAPRI-
UMC Report #05-01, University of Missouri, Columbia, July. 
 
_____. 2001. “Analysis of the Grain, Oilseed, and Cotton Provisions of the Agriculture, 
Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001 – S. 1731”  FAPRI-UMC 
Report #18-01, University of Missouri, Columbia, November. 
 
_____. 2002. “The House and Senate Farm Bills: A Comparative Study” FAPRI Policy 
Working Paper #01-02, University of Missouri, Columbia, March. 
 
_____. 2002. “Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002:  Preliminary FAPRI 
Analysis.”  FAPRI-UMC Report #05-02, University of Missouri, Columbia, May. 
 
_____. 2003. “Primer to the 2002 Farm Bill.”  FAPRI-UMC, University of Missouri, 
Columbia, February. 
 
_____. 2003. “FAPRI 2003 U.S. Baseline Briefing Book.”  FAPRI-UMC Technical Data 
Report 04-03, University of Missouri, Columbia, March. 
 
